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Chapter 5
People Are the Perimeter
A few years ago, one of our senior managers began bringing his corporate laptop into 
the cafeteria at lunchtime. Typically, he’d find an empty table, set down the laptop, and 
then walk out of sight to get his lunch. As he perused the salads and main courses, made 
selections, and paid for his food, his laptop sat unattended in plain view of hundreds of 
people using the large cafeteria.
My security team noticed the neglected laptop and pointed it out to me. I discussed 
the issue with the manager a few times, but he continued leaving the laptop unattended. 
So eventually, I began taking the laptop and leaving my business card in its place.
Not surprisingly, the manager became somewhat annoyed. “Nobody’s going to steal 
the laptop because there are all these people around,” he said.
“Okay,” I responded. “I’ll never take your laptop or complain again on one condition. 
If you really trust everybody here, you’ll take off your wedding ring and leave it on top of 
the laptop. If you do that, you’ll never hear from me again.”
He thought about this for a while. Then he said, “You made your point.” And he never 
again left the laptop unattended.
The Shifting Perimeter
This incident helped crystallize in my mind a new perspective about how we should 
approach information security. It occurred soon after we transitioned from desktop to 
laptop computers within Intel, and it demonstrated how each person’s daily decisions 
can affect the risk dynamics of the company overall.
The traditional enterprise security paradigm, often expressed in castle-and-drawbridge 
terms, described a wall of technology that isolated and completely protected the  
workers behind it. To protect our people and information assets, we focused our efforts 
on fortifying the network perimeter and the physical perimeter of our buildings.
Today, however, a growing number of user interactions with the outside world 
bypass the physical and network perimeters and the security controls these perimeters 
offer. They take place on external web sites and social networks, on laptops in coffee 
shops and homes, and on personal devices such as smartphones. The laptop left 
unattended in the cafeteria was clearly inside the physical perimeter, but the corporate 
information it contained was still potentially at risk due to the manager’s actions.
This changing environment doesn’t mean the security perimeter has vanished. 
Instead, it has shifted to the user. People have become part of the perimeter. Every day, 
users make decisions that can have as much impact on security as the technical controls 
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we use. Do I leave my computer unattended or not? Do I post this information online or 
not? Do I install this software on my device? Do I report this suspicious-looking e-mail? 
When I’m in a coffee shop, do I connect to the corporate infrastructure via a secure virtual 
private network, or do I engage directly over the Internet?
We could view each of these decisions purely in terms of the potential for increased 
risk. However, there’s also a positive side. If users become more aware of security and 
make better decisions, they can strengthen the organization’s defenses by helping identify 
threats and prevent impact.
Therefore, as information security professionals, we are in the behavior modification 
business. Our goals include creating a more security-conscious workforce so that 
users are more aware of threats and vulnerabilities and make better security decisions. 
Furthermore, we need to influence employees’ behavior both within the workplace and 
when they are home or traveling.
If the manager was comfortable leaving his laptop unattended in our cafeteria, 
would he also leave it unattended at the local coffee shop? At the airport? Or somewhere 
else where the risk of loss was even greater? My belief is he probably would. When trying 
to influence this person’s behavior, I wanted to achieve more than a level of compliance. I 
wanted to initiate a feeling of commitment.
The term compliant behavior implies making the minimum effort necessary to 
achieve good performance to a predefined standard. It’s like checking boxes on a list of 
security compliance items. Ultimately, employees feel they are being compelled to follow 
someone else’s list of instructions. Because of this, compliance requires supervision and 
policing, and employees may sometimes engage in lengthy recreational complaining. 
If employees are simply following a checklist, what happens when they encounter a 
situation that’s not on the list? They stop and await further instructions, or perhaps they 
are even unaware of the threat or ignore it.
In contrast, committed behavior is intrinsically motivated and self-directed. Being 
committed implies that people are emotionally impelled to invest in security—they 
take responsibility and ownership. When people feel committed, they tend to deliver 
above and beyond the bare minimum. Rather than simply following a predefined list of 
instructions, they are empowered to make decisions and judgment calls in real time, with 
a focus on how their actions affect others as well as themselves.
If we can create this sense of commitment in our users, we can implement security 
not as a wall but as a collective security force that permeates the entire organization. 
Individually and as a group, every person in the corporation uses their skills in security to 
protect the organization, handling known attacks today as well as quickly adapting to new 
threats tomorrow.
When I needed to influence the manager’s behavior, I looked for a way to establish 
this level of commitment. I sought to change the way he felt about the laptop, and to do 
this I tapped into his emotional connection to his wedding ring.
Creating a culture of self-motivated commitment rather than compliance can make 
a big difference, as shown in studies by management guru Dov Seidman. His group 
looked at behavioral differences between businesses with a culture of self-governance, 
in which an organization’s purpose and values inform employee decision-making and 
behavior, and those with a culture of blind obedience based on command-and-control 
and coercion. Organizations based on self-governance experienced three times more 
employee loyalty and half as many incidents of misconduct, compared with organizations 
based on blind obedience (Seidman 2011).
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The implications for enterprise security are clear. As the boundaries between 
personal and corporate computing dissolve, employees may be accessing information 
from any location, on any device. If users behave in an insecure way while they are in 
the office, it’s likely they will also exhibit insecure behavior when they’re elsewhere. 
Conversely, if we can create a feeling of commitment that causes them to own 
responsibility for security, there’s a better chance they will behave more securely both 
within the workplace and when they are outside our physical perimeter. This change 
in behavior improves the security of the device they are using, the information they are 
accessing, their personal lives, and the enterprise.
Examining the Risks
Before discussing ways that we can modify user behavior, I’d like to briefly mention an 
example of what can happen if we don’t influence the ways that users think and act.
As an experiment, the US Department of Homeland Security secretly dropped disks 
and thumb drives in the parking lots of government and private contractors’ buildings. 
Their goal was to see whether people would pick them up and plug them into their 
computers. As reported by Bloomberg News (Edwards et al. 2011), up to 60 percent of the 
people who picked up the items inserted them into their office computers. That number 
rose to 90 percent if the item included an official-looking logo. Clearly, the security 
behavior of employees at these facilities left quite a bit to be desired.
If that’s what happens with technologies that have been around for decades, think 
about what can happen with newer, more sophisticated exploits. Today, threats may 
arrive in the form of carefully crafted personalized communications designed to win the 
trust of targeted users. These users then unwittingly provide access to the information the 
attackers want.
Let’s say a company is looking to hire a credit analyst with a very specific set of skills. 
Attackers notice this and apply online, using a résumé that lists the exact skills required 
for the job, and contains the terms the company’s résumé-scanning software is likely to 
be looking for. Suitably impressed, the company’s human-resources specialists forward 
the application to the company’s credit-department manager, who has access to all 
the systems storing customer financial data. The manager trusts this communication 
because it’s sent from another department within the same company. So she clicks on the 
link to the résumé. Unfortunately, that action triggers the execution of malicious code. 
The human-resources team effectively acted as an infection agent, ensuring the attack 
reached its real target.
Careless behavior outside the enterprise can create other risks. In a blog post, 
software engineer Gary LosHuertos (2010) described how, while sitting in a café, he 
used a freely available packet-sniffing tool to obtain the social media identities of around 
40 people who were using the café’s Wi-Fi network. Some of these people remained 
logged into the social media site even after he sent them messages informing them that 
he had just collected their login information. As he explained, a compromised account 
doesn’t just provide access to the social media site; it can also be used to perform social 
engineering attacks and gain access to a wide range of other resources.
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Social media accounts can become sources of risk even when they haven’t been 
compromised. Users frequently post information on external social-media sites that 
attracts the attention of competitors or the media. To boost their job prospects, interns 
mention product features they helped develop during their summer job at a well-known 
company; sales representatives reveal the names of major clients; even senior executives 
have been known to unintentionally disclose key corporate strategies. In fact, services 
exist that specialize in aggregating apparently minor snippets of information from  
social-media and other web sites to build an accurate view of a company’s size, 
geographical distribution, and business strategy, including hiring patterns that indicate 
whether the company is expanding and which new areas it is moving into.
Adjusting Behavior
To counter these new risks, we need to make employees aware and empowered, so they 
act as an effective part of the security perimeter.
At Intel, we have focused for several years on building security and privacy 
protection into the corporate culture, getting employees to own responsibility for 
protecting enterprise and personal information. Achieving this has required a lot of effort, 
and we’ve realized that it takes just as much work to maintain a culture of security and 
privacy as to build it.
Training is a key part of our efforts. We have found training is particularly effective 
when general security training, which fulfills most legal requirements, is supplemented 
by targeted training. Some roles and job duties pose a greater risk to data than others; 
employees who have access to sensitive information receive specialized courses that 
focus on their specific needs.
We’ve found that another effective technique is to embed security and privacy 
training into business processes. When an employee requests access to an application 
that handles sensitive information, they are automatically prompted to take training that 
focuses on the related security and privacy concerns. We have also moved toward online 
training, including video and other visually stimulating material as well as entertaining, 
interactive tools to help engage users. In the “Find the Phish” game, for example, 
users learn how to spot fake web sites designed to lure them into revealing personal 
information (see Figure 5-1).
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However, it is not enough to create good training. If nobody takes the training, 
the effort is wasted. We have found incentives such as public recognition, combined 
with a training and awareness campaign, can help ensure employees undergo training 
and absorb the lessons. We promote training through positive messages, sometimes 
associated with themes such as online scavenger hunts. Ultimately, if people continue to 
avoid security training, we escalate compliance efforts by directly contacting them and 
their managers.
Figure 5-1. Intel’s internal “Find the Phish” interactive training tool helps employees spot 
web scams. Source: Intel Corporation, 2012
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We’ve also found we can help maintain and increase awareness by publishing 
security-related articles on Intel’s primary employee portal (see Figure 5-2 and the 
sidebar article). Many of these articles include a personal aspect, such as preventing 
identity theft, keeping children safe online, and home wireless security tips. We believe 
this personal aspect helps continuously reinforce our connection with employees 
and helps them more easily absorb the messages. The focus on personal concerns is 
also a recognition that the way employees behave outside the office is as important to 
enterprise security as their behavior in the office. These articles are also a good way to 
keep employees abreast of trends such as the growth of fake antivirus software. Other 
articles help to remind people of basic security issues, such as why it’s important to avoid 
downloading applications from the Web, clicking mysterious attachments, and using 
weak passwords.
Figure 5-2. Some of Intel’s internal security-related articles for employees include a personal 
aspect, to encourage secure behavior both within and outside the workplace. Source: Intel 
Corporation, 2012
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hOW tO MaKe SUre NO ONe CaN aCCeSS YOUr INteL 
Or perSONaL Data ON YOUr SMartphONe
ensure private information and Intel Ip are properly protected  
with these simple steps
Story by: Secure intel
ahh, the good old days—when the only way to access your intel e-mail account was 
through your laptop or desktop pC. But now, you can read corporate e-mail on your 
personal handheld device. Gone are the late call-ins to meetings because you had to 
wait for the bridge data-filled computer to boot up.
But with new conveniences come new necessary precautions. Because intel e-mail 
is now available on our personal smartphones, it’s important to take steps to protect 
the personal information and intellectual property we may be carrying on our 
handheld devices. how can you go about doing this? easy:
1. install a password on your iphone (or other smartphone).
2. “remote wipe” your smartphone if it’s ever lost or stolen.
Just as we take steps to protect information on our laptops by installing encryption, 
we need to safeguard data on our smartphones. password protection offers the first 
line of defense. But if you leave your phone in a restaurant or on a plane, a “remote 
wipe” can help increase the chances that your personal information—and intel’s 
intellectual property—doesn’t fall into the wrong hands.
The Payoff
How do we know our security efforts pay off? We’ve accumulated a variety of evidence. 
These include independent benchmark results from the Information Risk Executive 
Council (2011), which indicate that over the last five years, Intel employees consistently 
ranked in the top 10 percent of companies for secure behavior.
We also experience laptop loss rates that are substantially lower than industry 
averages. Among more than 300 companies studied by the Ponemon Institute, the average 
rate of lost and stolen laptops ranged from 5 to 10 percent over a laptop’s three-year 
lifespan. For the past several years, Intel’s laptop loss rates have consistently been much 
lower than this, below 1 percent annually. I attribute this largely to our employees’ level of 
commitment and sense of responsibility, in addition to the fact that we allow reasonable 
personal use of the laptop, as I’ll discuss later.
We continue to observe examples of employees acting as part of the security 
perimeter. Recently, dozens of users alerted us to a suspicious text message they’d 
received via their personal or corporate smartphones. They thought the message 
looked odd and was potentially fraudulent. At the time, we didn’t know whether this 
message was an exploit specifically targeting Intel, or a more widespread scam aimed at 
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taking advantage of consumers in general. In a sense, it didn’t really matter because a 
compromised personal environment can affect the security of the enterprise. By requiring 
employees to register their personal or corporate mobile devices, we have a database of 
all these devices. So we sent an alert to all of these users warning them of the problem.
This incident also illustrates how intruders are shifting to exploit new areas of 
vulnerability. As e-mail filtering improves, threats move to less-protected newer channels 
such as phone texting and instant messages.
In another less serious case, our human-resources group wanted to survey a broad 
cross section of Intel employees to gather their opinions of the company. They hired an 
outside agency, which dutifully e-mailed the survey to thousands of employees. Within 
minutes, our help desk phones lit up, as employees called to say they were receiving 
suspicious e-mails from outside the company. Administrative coordinators warned teams 
not to open the messages, and my security group began blocking the e-mails. Soon after 
this, we received an anguished call from the frantic manager who had funded the survey. 
Though this was frustrating for HR, it helped validate our security awareness work. 
After we had invested significantly in awareness campaigns, the employees’ responses 
provided supporting evidence that we really had influenced behavior.
Roundabouts and Stop Signs
To try to reduce driving accidents at a dangerous curve in Chicago, the city painted a 
series of white lines across the road. As drivers approached the sharpest point of the 
curve, the spacing between the lines progressively decreased, giving the drivers the 
illusion they were speeding up, and nudging them to tap their brakes. The result was a  
36 percent drop in crashes, as described by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein in their 
book Nudge (Yale University Press, 2008).
This traffic-control method succeeded in making drivers more aware and improving 
safety while keeping the traffic flowing with minimum disruption. I think this example 
provides a useful metaphor for information security. Some security controls are like stop 
signs or barriers: we simply block access to technology or data. But if we can shape the 
behavior of employees rather than blocking them altogether, we’ll allow employees, and 
therefore the company, to move faster.
To use another traffic metaphor, a roundabout at an intersection typically results in 
more efficient traffic flow than an intersection with stop signs, because drivers don’t have 
to come to a complete halt. The roundabout increases drivers’ awareness, but they can 
proceed without stopping if the way is clear. Statistics have shown roundabouts are often 
safer than intersections.
Of course, we need to block access in some situations, such as with illegal web sites. 
But there are cases where it’s more efficient and productive to make users aware of the 
risks, yet leave them empowered to make the decisions themselves. For example, it might 
make sense to warn users visiting certain countries that they may be accessing material 
that is considered unacceptable. Here’s a hypothetical example. A US employee traveling 
on business might be working in a local office of a country with strict religious guidelines. 
The employee has a daughter who’s in a beauty pageant—so it would be natural to check 
the pageant web site from time to time. But the images could be offensive in the country, 
so it makes sense to warn the employee to exercise caution. At Intel, we’ve found that 
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when we warn users in this way about potentially hazardous sites, the vast majority heed 
the warnings and don’t access the web sites.
In the case of information security, there’s an additional benefit of making controls 
as streamlined as possible. We all know if controls are too cumbersome or unreasonable, 
users may simply find ways around them.
We kept this concern in mind when developing a social media strategy at Intel IT 
(Buczek and Harkins 2009). We were well aware of the risks associated with social media, 
but attempting to stop the use of external social media web sites would have been 
counterproductive and, in any case, impossible. We realized that if we did not embrace 
social media and define ways to use it, we would lose the opportunity to shape employee 
behavior.
As part of our initial investigation into this area, we conducted a social media 
risk assessment. We found social media does not create new risks, but can increase 
existing ones. For example, there’s always been a risk that information can be sent to 
inappropriate people outside the organization. However, posting the same information 
on a blog or forum increases the risk by immediately exposing the information to a much 
wider audience. We also determined that we could reduce risk by implementing social 
media tools within the organization.
So we developed a social media strategy that included several key elements. We 
deployed internal social media capabilities, such as wikis, forums, and blogs. Initially, 
these were mostly standalone tools, and employees used them mainly to connect socially 
rather than for core business functions. Since then, our use has evolved to include 
more enterprise-focused tools, and we have integrated the tools into line-of-business 
applications to achieve project and business goals. We’ve also added social media tools 
tailored for specific business groups, such as a secure collaboration solution used by 
design teams to simplify real-time sharing of confidential project information across 
geographically dispersed teams.
As we designed our internal social media capabilities, we also worked with Intel’s 
human-resources groups to develop guidelines for employee participation in external 
social media sites. Intel then developed an instructional video that was posted externally 
on a public video-sharing site. The video candidly explains Intel’s goals and concerns, 
as well as providing guidance for employees. It explains that Intel wants to use social 
media to open communications channels with customers, partners, and influencers and 
to encourage people to adopt the technology, as well as close the feedback loop. The 
information also includes guidance about how to create successful content and general 
usage guidelines such as the need to be transparent, respect confidentiality, distinguish 
between opinion and fact, and to admit mistakes.
We also use technology to help ensure that employees follow the guidelines. We 
monitor the Internet for posts containing information that could expose us to risks, and 
we also monitor internal social media sites to detect exposure of sensitive information 
and violations of workplace ethics or privacy.
The Security Benefits of Personal Use
When it comes to technology consumerization, information security specialists tend 
to focus on the security risks. As I discussed earlier in the book, we’ve found that the 
productivity benefits easily outweigh the risks. But even the security implications are not 
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as one-sided as they might seem at first glance. I believe that, in some respects, allowing 
personal use may actually encourage better security.
In general, people are likely to take better care of their own possessions than 
someone else’s. They feel a stronger connection to their own car than to one provided 
by their employer. If people are using their own computing device, they may take better 
precautions against theft or loss. And they may feel the same way if they are storing 
personal information on a corporate device. At Intel, we allow reasonable personal use 
of corporate laptops, and therefore many employees store personal as well as corporate 
information on their laptops. Because of this, they have a personal stake in ensuring the 
devices don’t get lost or stolen.
I believe this sense of ownership contributes to our lower-than-average laptop loss 
rates. And recently, another company’s experience provided some empirical evidence 
supporting this idea. The company conducted a computing tablet pilot deployment 
in which, for the first time, it allowed personal use of corporate devices. At the end of 
the pilot, the company found that breakage and loss rates were dramatically reduced 
compared to its past experience with mobile devices. The CIO’s conclusion was that 
employees simply take better care of devices when they use them for personal purposes. 
Due to the lower loss rates, the company saved money.
It may also be worthwhile to reexamine other assumptions about the security 
implications of personal devices. Some companies have policies forbidding the use of 
cameras in their offices. However, a smartphone includes a camera that employees can 
use to capture the off-the-cuff design sketches often scrawled on whiteboards during 
brainstorming sessions. This intellectual property can then be stored on a hard drive 
within the enterprise and encrypted. Is it safer to allow employees to photograph the 
image, or to copy it onto a piece of paper, or to leave it on the whiteboard where anyone 
might see it? Companies may come to different conclusions, depending on their culture 
and appetite for risk. But this is another illustration of the importance of considering all 
the possible business benefits, as well as the risks when making technology decisions.
Sealing the Gaps
Many organizations, including Intel, use disk encryption on laptops to protect data in the 
event the laptop is lost or stolen. Adoption of disk encryption accelerated when states 
began passing privacy protection laws, and the consequences of data theft increased 
as a consequence. However, with some disk encryption software, the latest data isn’t 
encrypted until the user shuts down the PC or puts it into hibernate mode. If users simply 
put the PC into standby by closing the lid, the system may contain recently created data 
that is still unencrypted and vulnerable. If the PC is stolen at that point, the thief still has 
to penetrate the usual login access controls, but that’s much easier than figuring out how 
to decrypt the data.
I realized many IT professionals were unaware of this when I spoke at a CIO 
conference soon after the first major privacy legislation was passed. I asked the audience 
how many of them had deployed disk encryption. Most raised their hands. I asked how 
many had experienced lost or stolen laptops since deploying encryption. Again, nearly 
all raised their hands. Then I asked how many of them had established a process for 
evaluating the state of a lost system to determine if the data on it was truly encrypted. 
This time, nearly all the hands stayed down.
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I then explained why some laptops might contain unencrypted data, and asked 
how many of the audience thought they should issue a breach notification. At this point 
there was a silence, followed by a buzz of activity as attendees rushed off to make calls to 
security specialists at their companies.
When our security group analyzed this data encryption issue, we decided that we 
needed to be careful about how we addressed it. We wanted to ensure data on laptops 
was protected, but we didn’t want to disrupt the users’ experience by forcing them to shut 
down their laptops more frequently, and then endure the subsequent lengthy reboots. 
So we adjusted the system settings to initiate encryption whenever the laptop was left 
unused for a specific length of time. Now, if a laptop is lost or stolen, based on the time 
that elapsed since the employee last used it, we can determine the likelihood that it 
contains unencrypted data. While making this change to technical security controls, we 
also increased our efforts to educate employees about secure behavior.
The IT Professional
So far, in discussing the people perimeter, I’ve focused mainly on the security roles of end 
users. But let’s not forget that IT professionals are also a part of the people perimeter, and 
that their actions can have major positive or negative effects.
IT professionals manage almost every element of the technology spanning our 
networks, data centers, and users’ computing devices. They develop and install software. 
They configure, administer, and monitor systems. Their actions or inaction can make the 
difference between a system that is vulnerable and one that is reasonably secure.
Servers, which are typically managed by IT professionals, are still the IT assets 
most commonly attacked and robbed of data. An attacker may initially gain access to 
your company by compromising a user’s laptop, but the biggest prize—databases of 
corporate intellectual property and personal information—still reside on the enterprise 
servers. To steal that information, the attacker may use a compromised end-user device 
to search the network for servers with inadequately configured access controls. Surveys 
show most attacks continue to exploit security holes that organizations could easily have 
fixed. Among organizations surveyed for the 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report, an 
astonishing 96 percent of breaches could have been avoided using simple or intermediate 
controls, and 92 percent of attacks were not categorized as highly difficult (Verizon 2011). 
“Every year that we study threat actions leading to data breaches, the story is the same; 
most victims aren’t overpowered by unknowable and unstoppable attacks. For the most 
part, we know them [the attacks] well enough and we also know how to stop them,” the 
authors concluded.
Similar trends can be seen in the incidence of software errors. Many of the most 
serious, frequently exploited vulnerabilities in software are due to well-known errors that 
are “often easy to find, and easy to exploit,” as noted in the 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most 
Dangerous Software Errors (CWE/SANS 2011). Furthermore, the situation does not seem 
to be improving. As David Rice, author of Geekonomics (Addison-Wesley Professional, 
2007), puts it, most software is not sufficiently engineered to fulfill its designated role as 
the foundation for our products, services, and infrastructure (Rice 2007). This is partly 
due to the fact that incentives to improve quality are “missing, ineffectual, or even 
distorted,” he concluded. To compete, suppliers focus on bringing products to market 
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faster and adding new features, rather than on improving quality. Rice estimated, based 
on government data, that “bad” error-ridden software cost the United States a staggering 
USD 180 billion even back in 2007.
Not surprisingly, the typical recommendations for improving IT security often 
sound remarkably familiar. That’s because they address problems already known to most 
organizations, but not fully addressed. For example, the recommendations of the Data 
Breach Investigations Report include ensuring passwords are unique; regularly reviewing 
user accounts to ensure they are valid and properly configured; securing remote access; 
increasing employee awareness using methods such as training; and application testing 
and code review to prevent exploits such as SQL injection attacks and cross-site scripting, 
which take advantage of common software errors.
The fact that these measures do not appear to be rigorously applied at many 
organizations takes us back to a key theme of this chapter: that the commitment of 
employees is as important as the policies and procedures you have in place. If IT 
administrators and enterprise developers are committed rather than just following 
directives, if they feel personally responsible for the security of the enterprise, they will be 
more conscientious about ensuring the right technical controls are in place.
Insider Threats
It’s an unfortunate reality that many intentional threats originate within the organization. 
Among the 600 organizations participating in the 2011 Cybersecurity Watch Survey  
(CSO et al. 2011), about 20 percent of attacks were attributed to insiders.
The damage can be substantial. One employee working for a manufacturer 
stole blueprints containing trade secrets worth USD 100 million, and sold them to a 
Taiwanese competitor in hopes of obtaining a new job with them. Insider attacks also 
cause additional harm that can be hard to quantify and recoup, such as damage to an 
organization’s reputation. Insiders have a significant advantage because they can bypass 
physical and technical security measures such as firewalls and intrusion detection 
systems that were designed to prevent unauthorized access.
Yet surveys have also suggested that many insider attacks are opportunistic, rather 
than highly planned affairs. Many insiders take data after they’ve already accepted a job 
offer from a competitor or another company, and steal data to which they already have 
authorized access. In some cases, misguided employees may simply feel they’re entitled 
to take information related to their job.
It may not be possible to thwart all insider exploits, but we can take action to deter 
the more opportunistic attacks. Perhaps the biggest step we can take is to try to instill a 
culture of commitment. But we can also use technology to help against insider attacks.
As part of our security strategy at Intel, we’re implementing monitoring technology 
that tracks users’ logins and access attempts. At many companies, IT organizations treat 
such login data as information that should be closely held and not revealed to users. 
However, our strategy is to make login information available to users so that they can 
act as part of the perimeter, helping to spot anomalous access attempts. Let’s say an 
employee’s log indicates that he accessed the network from Asia yesterday, when in fact 
he was in Europe. The security organization might be unaware that anything untoward 
has occurred. But it’s obvious to the employee that someone stole his smartphone or his 
access information, and he can alert us to the breach.
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Providing this login information to users can also help deter insider attacks. If 
unscrupulous insiders know they’re being watched, they’re less likely to take advantage. 
It’s like the corner store that invested in a CCTV camera; when you walk up to the counter, 
you see yourself in the display. Now consider the store on the next corner that lacks a 
camera. Which one is more likely to be robbed?
Finding the Balance
Whether we like it or not, people are already part of the perimeter. Technical controls 
alone are no longer able to keep pace with rapidly changing attacks, especially when 
those attacks are combined with sophisticated social engineering. It’s up to us, as security 
professionals, to recognize that people, policy, and technology are all fundamental 
components of any security system, and to create strategies that balance these components. 
Above all, we need to create a sense of personal commitment and security ownership among 
our employees. If we succeed in this goal, we will empower employees to help protect the 
enterprise by making better security decisions both within and outside the workplace.
